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
1st Bn, 9th Marines
DA NANG, RVN
050300H Aug 1965

AFTER ACTION REPORT NUMBER 1-65

Ref: (a) 9th Mar Order 3100.1
(b) 9th Mar Frag Order 8-65
(c) Map: INDOCHINA 1:50,000, AMS Series L701, Sheets 6659III and 6658IV

Time Zone: H

1. In accordance with reference (a), Annexes A through F are forwarded herewith.
2. The operation for which this report is filed was executed in compliance with reference (b). Frag Order 7-65 was issued verbally on 2 August, and a summary of the order will be appended to this unit's Command Diary for the month of August 1965.
3. This report is based on information derived from detailed debriefings of personnel involved, published operation orders, staff journals, and radio logs.



VERLE E. LUDWIG
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding

ANNEXES:

- A - Units Involved
- B - Statistical Data
- C - Narrative Summary
- D - Problems and Difficulties Encountered
- E - Lessons Learned
- F - Suggestions for Future Operations

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1/9
a/a Ref #1-65 (Com NF I-III)

3 Aug 65

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1st Bn, 9th Marines
 DA NANG, RVN
 050800H Aug 1965

ANNEX A (Units Involved) to After Action Report No. 1-65

1st Bn, 9th Marines (-) (Rein)

Company "D" (Rein)

2d Plat, Co "B", 1st AmTrac Bn (OpCon)
 Plat, 594th RF Co (ARVN)
 Sqd, Flamethrower Sect
 PAC Tm
 FO Tm, 81mm Mort Plat
 FO Tm, Btry "D", 2d Bn, 12th Mar
 Ln NCO, 3d Tk Bn
 Btry "E", 2d Bn, 12th Mar (Direct Support)
 Sect, 106mm RR Plat (Direct Support)
 Sect, 81mm Mort Plat (Direct Support)
 Mine Det Tm, 3d Engr Bn (Standby Basis)

Capt WEST
 1st Lt MAY

STRENGTHS

Company "D" (Rein)	243	
2d Plat, Co "B", 1st AmTrac Bn	42	
	285	(Direct Support units not included in totals.)

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1st Bn, 9th Marines
DA NANG, RVN
050800H Aug 1965

ANNEX B (Statistical Data) to After Action Report No. 1-65

1. Significant Times

- a. Period of Operation: 030800H to 031730H Aug 1965.
- b. Arrived LOD: 031040H Aug 1965.
- c. Crossed LOD: 031100H Aug 1965.
- d. Initial Enemy Encounter: 031130H Aug 1965.
- e. Location at 1200H: GC 975692 to 975697.
- f. Location at 1500H: GC 978593 to 976685.
- g. Withdrawal and New Mission Assigned: 1530H.
- h. Heavy Volume of VC Small Arms Fire Received During Withdrawal: 1555H.
- i. Artillery and Mortars Fired Concentrations: 1625H.
- j. New Order Cancelled and Company Ordered to Proceed to Phong Le Bridge: 1700H.
- k. Company Arrived Phong Le Bridge and Operation Terminated: 1730H.
- l. Battalion OP Opened 0800H, Closed 1730H.

2. Area of Operations Defined. Approximately four (4) miles south southwest of Da Nang Air Base, south of Song Cau Do River, west of the railroad between GC 999700 to 992600, east of the Song Yen River, and north of grid line 68. The objective of the attack was the Cam Ne (1) and Cam Ne (2) village complexes, vicinity of GC 690990.

3. Casualties

a. Battle

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>VC</u>	<u>CIVILIANS</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
KIA	0	*7	1	VC not confirmed. See Annex C for civilian KIA.
WIA	4	*8	5	Two (2) VC confirmed. One (1) civilian gunshot wound in leg (evacuated). One (1) USMC gunshot wound lower abdomen. One (1) USMC gunshot wound upper thigh. One (1) USMC gunshot wound buttocks. One (1) USMC minor wound from punji-stake.

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a. Battle (Conte.)

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>VC</u>	<u>CIVILIANS</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
POW	0	5 (VCS)	0	No confirmed VC.

b. Non Battle

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>VC</u>	<u>CIVILIANS</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
Wounded	1			Wounds, puncture, multiple, right arm, neck, and face. Caused by gravel from 106mm RR back blast.

* - VC casualty estimates based on observed fire and blood traces. Two (2) confirmed WIA's were seen being dragged from battle area.

4. Nature of Action. Search and destroy. Seize Cam Ne (1) and (2) complex, defend the complex to the west, southwest, and south.

5. Total Estimated Enemy Contact. 33 VC. Maximum number encountered at one (1) time, 12 to 15. Most VC sighted in one (1) group, 5.

6. Enemy Weapons Encountered. .30 calibre machineguns of unknown number. Estimate two (2). Two (2) automatic rifles, probably .30 calibre carbines. Numerous semi-automatic rifles, probably .30 calibre carbines.

7. Mines and Booby Traps Encountered and Destroyed.

a. Assorted punji traps and pits: 267.

b. Malayan type gates: 12.

c. Malayan whips: 6.

d. Single grenade booby traps: 3.

e. Hedgerow with multiple booby traps. Destroyed by LVT.

f. Booby trapped AP mines: 6.

g. Mine or booby trap of large blast yield of unknown type was detonated by a 3.5 Inch Rocket dud which activated it after passing through a hedgerow.

8. Other Structures/Positions Destroyed

Huts and buildings: 51.

Trenches, tunnels, and prepared positions: 38.

9. Ammunition/Demolitions Expended

<u>TYPE AMMUNITION/DEMOLITIONS</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>
Ctg, 7.62mm, Single	3,426
Ctg, 7.62mm, Linked	1,520

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<u>TYPE AMMUNITION/DEMOLITIONS (Cont.)</u>	<u>NUMBER (Cont.)</u>
Ctg, Cal. .45	9
Rkt, 3.5", HE	11
Shell, 20mm HE	45
Grenade, Hand Frag	68
Smoke, yellow	7
Smoke, green	1
Explosive, C-4	30 lbs.
Tanks for Flamethrowers	3
Cap, Blasting, Non-electric	6
Lighter, fuse	5
Fuse, Time	10 feet
Shell, 105mm	45 Smk, EC
-do-	25 Smk, WP
-do-	24 HE
Shell, 81mm mortar	7 Smk, WP
-do-	20 HE
Shell, 106mm HEAT	3
Shell, 90mm HE	18
Ctg, Cal. .50	328

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1stBn, 9th Marines
 DA NANG, RVN
 050800 H Aug 1965

ANNEX C (Narrative Account of Operation) to After Action Report 1-65

The concept of the operation established the operation as a one day reinforced rifle company search and destroy operation in the area indicated in the attached overlay. The area was to be swept from west to east, with the village complex of Cam Ne (1) and Cam Ne (2) at the east end of the sweep area designated as objective A. Upon securing the objective, the company would establish a defensive position from vicinity of 995684 around the village on the southwest to vicinity of 985690. The defense would be oriented toward the southwest and would be tied in with G-2/9 on the left flank. Depending on the progress of a 3d Marines operation moving from the south toward the objective area, Company "D" would remain in the defensive position until sometime on the 4th of August.

Movement to the LOD was by LVT from Phong Le Bridge, west on the Song Cau River, then south on the Song Yen River to an exit point at approximately GC 968692. Once out of the river, the LVTs would debark the troops on the LOD and proceed abreast to the first tree line vicinity of GC 972689. Upon reaching the tree line, the LVTs would search the tree line to clear obstacles, mines, and booby traps. The troops would follow in trace of the LVTs from the LOD.

The general scheme of maneuver as planned by the company commander was to initially search out Cam Ne (4) GC 969696 using the 1st platoon, cross the open rice fields and proceed abreast of the 2d and 3d platoons to the first tree line. The 1st platoon was assigned the left flank of the sweep area, the 2d platoon the center, and the 3d platoon on the right flank.

The entire company did not arrive at the LOD until 1040 because of 3 tractors being stuck in the Song Cau River. It was necessary to bring the spare tractors from Phong Le Bridge to accomplish a transfer of personnel.

Because of the delay in arriving at the LOD the Company Commander requested and received permission to by-pass Cam Le (4) and proceed to the tree line forward of the LOD. The OP located west of the Song Cau River was able to observe and bring direct fire on Cam Le (4) if necessary. Additionally, and because the OP could observe the entire left flank of the sweep area an adjustment of platoon sector assignments was made by the Company Commander before the LOD was crossed. (See attached overlay).

The mission assigned to the LVTs was as follows: Debark troops at LOD and move across the LOD on line and advance to the near hedge row, break through to clear obstacles and booby traps. Once the hedge row was penetrated the LVTs would provide flank security and on call obstacle clearing missions. Tractors were distributed with 4 tractors on each flank and two in the center of the Company sector.

The LVTs were able to traverse the rice fields, most of which were flooded with knee to hip deep water. Slight difficulty was encountered on high and wide dikes and in the deeper bodies of water and marsh. The main stream as indicated on the map in the center of the Company sector could only be crossed in 2 places. (See overlay). It cannot be safely crossed by infantry troops except at man made

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crossings (Bamboo bridges).

When the IVTs reached the tree line previously mentioned, the troops moved forward from the LOD. The 3d platoon on the right flank received machine gun and automatic weapons fire from numerous positions inside the tree line to their front as soon as they began to advance. 3.5 rocket, M-79, and small arms immediately returned fire, gained fire superiority, and moved toward the tree line. As the 3d Platoon advanced, VC were seen withdrawing to the southeast.

In order to reduce exposure of the 3d platoon's right flank as the company advanced, the direction of attack was shifted more to the southeast in an attempt to keep the VC within the frontal zone of the sweep. The village complex extends in a southerly direction at this point also. The shift of D-3 and the fact that D-1 had proceeded to the tree line on the left caused a W shaped front with D-2 at the tree line edge in the center. Further delay was created initially by the necessity of maintaining physical contact between units in the heavy growth. As D-2 advanced through the tree line, the line straightened considerably, although D-3 was constantly being delayed because of continued VC sniper and automatic weapons fire on the right flank.

The stream in the center of the company sector created an extremely difficult obstacle which separated the 3d platoon from the remainder of the Company.

The search of the objective was a time consuming task of checking civilians, huts, and searching for booby traps and mines. The area is heavily combed with trails, trenches, and fighting holes. Most of these were located in the center and right portion of the Company sector. By 1200, the initial tree line had barely been penetrated, and by 1330 an additional 150 meters was gained. Progress was a little better during the next 2 hours and by 1530, the leading elements had reached a point about 750 meters from the LOD and platoons were all in contact, the 3d platoon having reoriented itself more to the east on the axis of attack.

The evacuation of 3 WIAs from the 3d platoon was also time consuming as each casualty had to be returned to the western edge of the tree line for air evacuation. Helicopter Landing Zones within the sweep area are non-existent because of the trees and density of the huts.

The search and destruction procedures consisted of complete destruction of defensive positions, holes, tunnels, booby traps, mines, and dwellings and structures from which hostile fire was taken. Houses were left untouched after searching, where no enemy activity had taken place. In all cases, women, children, and men were called together outside of dwellings before destruction. No civilians were fired upon or endangered when they could be segregated from the actual enemy. In 2 cases, VC were seen fleeing into huts after firing, and the huts were fired on immediately. In one of these huts, a Vietnamese boy of about 10 years of age was found dead. In another case, several civilians received minor wounds from flying debris following 3.5 fire on a concrete house. Every fire had been received from the vicinity.

By 1500, it was obvious that Cam Ne (1) and (2) could not be searched by nightfall. The Company Commander recommended that his unit be withdrawn by IWT, return to a position north of Cam Ne (1) and execute an attack to the south through the objective. The Battalion Commander approved the plan for execution as soon as

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possible, but reserved a decision until later as to whether the attack would be executed.

At 1530, withdrawal of LVTs and troops was begun. D-3, while attempting to break contact and move the LVTs with them, was hampered by many civilians, mostly women and children, who attempted to climb in and on the LVTs. These civilians pleaded to be taken out of the area when the Marines left. No civilians were evacuated.

As the company withdrew, they were followed by sporadic small arms fire from the east, and particularly from the D-3 sector. As the company was loading the LVTs at the LOD, at approximately 1555, a large volume of small arms and automatic weapons fire was received from the tree line just cleared. LVTs traversed the tree line with machine gun fire while small arms, 3.5 rockets, and M-79s were fired by the company. This fire fight lasted approximately 15 minutes, with no friendly casualties being sustained. Sporadic fire continued from the tree line as the loading of LVTs continued and as the column proceeded north toward the Song Cau River.

As soon as the LVTs started movement away from the tree line, a .50 caliber machine gun, located at the CP commenced firing, and 81 mortars and artillery registered on the tree line. When the LVTs reached the vicinity of Cam No. (4), artillery, mortars, and direct fire from the 90mm gun tank was concentrated on the tree line at GC 974637. Approximately 200 rounds of .50 caliber and 20 WP, and 50 rounds HE shells of assorted weapons were fired on the tree line in a 4-5 minute period. No surveillance was possible, but no further fire was heard from this area. Several rounds of small arms fire were received from the vicinity of the Song Yem River west of the LOD as the LVTs withdrew.

In view of the time lost in withdrawal, the Dn Cmdr ordered Company "D" to return to Phong Le Bridge with the LVTs and cancel the plans for attacking Cam No (1) and (2) from the north.

The LVTs proceeded down river with no difficulty and arrived at Phong Le Bridge at 1725. The LVTs were detached at this point, and D Company was returned to their CP by truck at 1830. The OP was secured at 1730 and the Battalion Commander returned to the Battalion CP.

APPENDIX:

1-Operations Overlay

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1st Bn, 9th Marines
DA NANG, RVN
021500H Aug 1965

1st Bn, 9th Marines Frag Order No. 7A-65

Ref: (a) 9th Marines Frag Order No. 7-65
(b) MAPS: INDOCHINA 1:50,000, AMS Series L701, Sheets 6659III and 6658IV

Time Zone: H

TASK ORGANIZATION

Company "D" (Rein)

Plat, 594th HF Co

Plat, 594th HF Co

FO Tm, 2d Bn, 12th Mar

InO, ARVN

FO Tm, 81mm Mort Plat

Squad, Flamethrower Sect

In HCO, 3d Tank Bn

2d Plat, Co "B", 1st AsFrag Bn D/S until approximately 031500H

Sect, 106mm RR Plat D/S

Sect, 81mm Mort Plat D/S

Mine Det, Co, 3d Engr Bn, D/S (Standby basis)

1. SITUATION

- a. General. Operation in support of Phase III operation of 3d Marine Division and 9th Marines occupation of TAOR south of Song Cau Do River. Operation is designed to clear area, and relieve pressure from 2/9 units east of GAM NE (1) and (2) and from 3d Marines operations to the south.
- b. Enemy. S-2 Briefings. 2/9 units operating in area have been continually harassed by small arms and automatic weapons fire from vicinity of GAM NE (1) and (2) located in grid squares (AT 9869), (AT 9868), and (AT 9968).
- c. Friendly
 - (1) 2/9 units located east of railroad tracks from coordinates (AT 999700) to (AT 994683) and north of grid line 68 vicinity of DUONG SON (1), QUANG-CHAU (2), and GIANG DONG, and east to vicinity of NIEU DONG (1).
 - (2) 3d Marines conduct search and destroy operation on 2-3 Aug.
 - (3) 1st MAF provides smoke aircraft on station 0900-1030. VA/VF aircraft on 15 minute alert.

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(4) 2/9 available to support operation by fire if required.

d. Attachments effective 021900H.

2. MISSION. Conduct search and destroy operation from Song Yen River eastward to vicinity of coordinates (AT 990690), seize and occupy Objective A (CAM NE (1) and (2)). Upon securing Objective A, establish defensive positions around the west, southwest, and south of CAM NE (1) and (2), establishing contact with 2/9 elements on the left flank. Secure from objective area on order and return to Company CP.

3. EXECUTION

a. Concept. Company "D" (Rein), supported by a platoon of LVT's, a section of 81mm mortars, artillery, section of 106mm RB, and D/S tanks executes a search and destroy operation commencing at 031000H. Sweep to be conducted from the SONG YEN River eastward to CAM NE (1) and (2). LVT's will support sweep to the LOA or until approximately 1500. The southern flank of the sweep area will be searched by aircraft commencing at 0925H. At 0930H, artillery will smoke to the west of CAM NE (1) and (2) and at 0935H, helicopters will make a deceptive landing to the east of CAM NE (1) and (2) under cover of the smoke. LVT's cross LOD by 1000H and commence sweep. D/S weapons located vicinity of Bn OP available on request. FG's with Company "D" control air, artillery, 81mm mortars, and can control D/F of tanks. Air will be on 15 minute alert.

Upon arrival Objective A, secure CAM NE (1) and (2) and assume a defensive posture to the west, southwest, and south of the objective. Tie in with 2/9 vicinity of coordinates (AT 993684).

On order, company will be withdrawn and returned to CP, but will be prepared to remain in defense overnight.


Company "A", as Division Replier unit will be on call to support the operation if required and 2/9 can provide supporting fires from present position if requested.

A Battalion OP will be established on the west side of the Song Cau Bo River, vicinity of coordinates (AT 975705), and supporting arms will be located vicinity of the OP. FSGC will be with the OP. All fire requests directed to the FSGC.

b. Company "D"

(1) Assemble at the Phong Le Bridge, coordinates (AT 997707), and load LVT's.

(2) At 0830H, splash LVT's and proceed to LOD.



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- (3) Cross LOD when deployed and execute search and destroy operation within zone, attacking eastward to seize Objective A.
- (4) Upon securing Objective A, assume a defense to the west, southwest, and south of CAM NE (1) and (2).
- (5) Establish contact with elements of 2/9 vicinity of coordinates (AT 993684) when establishing defense.
- (6) Remain in defensive positions until ordered to withdraw.
- (7) On order, withdraw to a pick-up point vicinity of coordinates (BT 000700) for return to Company CP by truck.

c. Company "A"

- (1) Provide company on one (1) hour alert as Division Reflex.
- (2) Provide one (1) platoon (Rein) on 10 minute alert for helo-lift to support Company "D" operation.
- (3) If deployed, be prepared to CHOP to Company "D" on lift-off.

d. Company "B"

- (1) Assume defense of new Battalion CP site as of 021800H. Be prepared to remain in this posture until 040800H.
- (2) Conduct patrols (squad size) within the Battalion FAOR in accordance with overlays provided.

e. Company "C". No change to mission.

f. H&S Company

- (1) Provide attachments as required.
- (2) Establish OP by 030800H.
- (3) One (1) section of Six Mortar Platoon in position ready to fire by 030800H.
- (4) With personnel presently in new Battalion OP location, augment CP defense as required by platoon of Company "B".
- (5) Have additional flame tanks charged and available for immediate delivery to Company "D" by helicopter.

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g. Communications Officer

- (1) Provide operational communications to support OP Group, installed and tested prior to 0800H.

h. S-4 Officer

- (1) Provide 20 additional water cans at assembly area by 0730H for loading in LVT's.
- (2) One (1) DCA pre-staged in Battalion Dump for delivery by helicopter.

i. Battery "D", 2d Bn, 12th Marines

- (1) In position to deliver on-call W/A missions by 030900H.
- (2) Provide smoke to screen CAM HE (1) and (2) in the west. Commence at 0930H and completed by 0935H.
- (3) Be prepared to deliver fires for mine clearance.

j. Coordinating Instructions

- (1) All LVT lifted units in LVT assembly area prior to 0800H. Flares, FAC Teams, artillery and 81 FO's, and ARVN proceed to Company "D" OP for necessary briefings prior to entrucking for assembly area.
- (2) H-Hour. Approximately 1000H. Cross LOD when there.
- (3) Take time on sweep.
- (4) Depart assembly area by 0830H.
- (5) Rules of Engagement
 - (a) Search and destroy.
 - (b) Return fire on houses from which hostile fire is received.
 - (c) No HE fires from indirect weapons without prior approval of Battalion FSCC.
 - (d) Make maximum use of demolitions/OS grenades to clear and destroy caves, trenches, and fortifications.
- (6) Reports. SPOTREPS as required and periodic location reports. Report crossing LOD, initial and subsequent enemy contact, casualties, and securing objectives. FLASHREPS on VG units. of platoon size or larger or incoming artillery or mortar fire.

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(7) Upper body armor/helmets (steel) worn by all ground units.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

a. Administration

- (1) Casualty Reporting. Report by initial of last name and serial number.
- (2) Casualty Evacuation. Helicopter MedEvac, Yellow snake, specify secure or non-secure zone, and whether medical assistance is required.

b. Logistics

- (1) Basic allowance ammunition, with maximum frag, demo, (CS grenades, and M79.
- (2) One (1) DCA staged for helicopter delivery.
- (3) Trucks to Company "D" CP by 0700H.
- (4) Emergency resupply by helicopter or truck.
- (5) Initially, two (2) meals MCI per man.
- (6) Additional water in LVT's.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS

a. Command. Battalion Commander on OP.

- (1) Commanding Officer, Company "D" OpCon LVT's and ground troops.

b. Communications:

- (1) OP communications established by Communications Officer.
- (2) PRC-10 per platoon.
- (3) Company on Battalion TAC with PRC-10.
- (4) LVT's on Company TAC, LVT CO on Bn TAC.
- (5) Tanks establish radio between OP and firing point.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL FERLE E. LUDWIG

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H. A. HATCH
Major, U. S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

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1stBn, 9th Marines
 DA NANG, RVN
 050800 H Aug 1965

ANNEX D (Problems and Difficulties Encountered) to After Action Report 1-65

A relatively short time was available for planning and coordination for the operation. Although no major difficulties were created by this lack of time, coordination between the Battalion and Hoa Vang District and 2d Battalion 9th Marines should have been closer. For example, the Battalion or Company Commander was not aware, until arrival at the LVT loading point at Phong Le Bridge, that U. S. Army Advisers, a Marine Liaison Officer, an interpreter, and an American Press representative was to accompany the unit on the operation.

Communications were a problem from the beginning of the operation, and in almost all cases the difficulties could be attributed to equipment breakdown. The Company to Battalion net was out most of the day. The LVT inter platoon radios were not functioning, the TAR net had to be relayed through Regiment to Battalion. Delta-1 was unable to communicate with the Company Commander on the Company TAC net, and the PRC-6's used at squad level and on the Company Tactical net placed too many stations on the net for control purposes. The only reliable communication between the Company and the Battalion during the entire operation was the PRC-9 of the Artillery FO.

The noise level created by the LVTs in close quarters precluded voice communication between infantry in their vicinity.

The LVTs becoming stuck in the river delayed crossing the LCD by almost 1 hour, although the time of attack was adjusted to give optimum tide conditions.

The map of the area was found to be very inaccurate. Using resection and the tank range finder from the OP, an error of 300-500 meters was found to exist on the map. Self-location by units in the objective area was next to impossible because of the inability to see any land marks or reference points.

As previously mentioned, the stream in the area effectively split units of the Company and created a difficult obstacle between them.

The hedgerows and tree lines within the objective area create natural obstacles to troops and vehicles and conceal well prepared fighting holes and trenches. The LVTs proved to be very effective in breaking these and clearing a safe passage through them.

The difficulty in maintaining physical contact was increased by the oddly shaped land tracts and the density of the houses and structures. Visual contact was restricted for this same reason.

Helicopter Landing Zones within the objective area are extremely limited because of trees and flooded rice paddies. Casualties had to be taken, with security, to a cleared area outside the tree/village complex for evacuation. Excessive delay in getting air med evac missions accomplished was attributed to communications delay between the FAC on the ground and the receipt of requests by the helicopter squadron.

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Hand. spoke used within the areas with heavy trees dissipated rapidly and could not be observed by the OP. This fact, plus the inability to accurately locate positions on the current map almost precludes the use of supporting arms in close proximity to the ground troops. The enemy is normally only seen at short distances and is a fleeting target.

The Company front assigned and that which had to be covered to counter enemy action was too wide for the type of mission assigned and for the time frame established. Because of this, the Company was unable to maintain a reserve and was consequently very vulnerable to attack from the rear.

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1st Bn, 9th Marines
 DA NANG, RVN
 050800H Aug 1965

ANNEX ^F (Suggestions for Future Operations) to After Action Report No. 1-65

If possible at the time, give prior notice of an attack to the civilian populace, or begin prep fires on the area with relatively non-lethal weapons such as smoke rounds. If prior notice cannot be given, then a helicopter with a loudspeaker, or Civil Affairs (ARVN) personnel with megaphones should accompany the ground unit to provide concise instructions to the civilians. It is extremely difficult for a ground commander to reconcile his tactical mission and a people-to-people program.

Provide a higher priority for aerial reconnaissance prior to execution of the operation.

Obtain up to date aerial photos if time permits. This becomes more important with the rainy season approaching, and with the flooding of rice fields in progress.

Include detonating cord in demolitions requirements for destruction of bunkers and tunnels.

When ARVN or PF troops are used in an operation, ensure an interpreter or English-speaking liaison officer, who will accompany the ground troops, is available at briefings.

Determine what liaison or advisory personnel are to accompany the ground units, and determine their purpose and scope of authority.

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1st Bn, 9th Marines
 DA NANG, RVN
 130100H Aug 1965

Frag Order No. 8-65

Ref: (a) Maps: INDOCHINA, 1:50,000, AMS Series L701, Sheets 6659III, 6658IV, and 6659II

Time Zone: H

TASK ORGANIZATION

1st Bn, 9th Marines (-) (Rein)
 593d RF Company
 Company "D" (-), 3d Recon Bn
 3d Plat, Company "B", 1st Bn, 9th Mar
 2d Plat, Company "D", 1st Bn, 9th Mar

LtCol LUDWIG

1. SITUATION

a. Enemy. Current intelligence sources report 15 to 20 VC or VC sympathizers reside in the village complex bounded by coordinates (BT 074697, BT 086703, BT 083711, and BT 066706), south of Marble Mountain (BT 076710), and within the 9th Marines TACR. These VCS allegedly leave the villages commencing about 0500 daily and return to the village in the late afternoon or evening.

b. Friendly

- (1) 593d RF Company is located vicinity of coordinates (BT 069704), provides security of Marble Mountain area, maintains outpost vicinity of coordinates (BT 080696), and conducts patrols north of grid line (BT 69) and east of the Song Cau Bien River.
- (2) Company "D" (-), 3d Recon Battalion maintains OP on Marble Mountain, operates a radio relay station at coordinates (BT 068704), and patrols the Da Nang East/NCB area north of Marble Mountain.
- (3) Company "B", 1st Bn, 9th Marines occupies MIR positions west of Marble Mountain in the 1/9 TACR with platoon strong points located at coordinates (BT 069700, BT 053694, and BT 041690) and patrols within assigned area.

c. Attachments and Detachments. None.

2. MISSION. On order, conduct a sweep and search operation within the village complex south of Marble Mountain in accordance with Annex A (Operations Overlay) and apprehend any suspected VC or VC sympathizers.

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3. EXECUTION

- a. Concept of Operations. Prior to 150445H, elements of 593d RF Company and Company "D", 3d Recon Battalion occupy blocking positions south and north of the sweep area. Two (2) reinforced rifle platoons of 1st Bn, 9th Marines deploy on the LOD prior to 150445H and on order, commence a sweep and search operation eastward to the LOA. Liaison personnel of the Battalion S-2 and the 593d RF Company will accompany the search elements to identify local officials or ARVN personnel. All suspects will be apprehended and will remain with the search elements until delivered to a collection point on the LOA for further interrogation. Upon arrival at the LOA and on order, the operation will terminate and units will return to their CP areas. This operation is considered to be a combined operation with 1st Bn, 9th Marines exercising overall coordination. No fire support is anticipated.
- b. 593d RF Company
- (1) By 150445H, occupy blocking positions from coordinates (BT 075696), northeast to coordinates (BT 085703), forces oriented in a northerly direction.
 - (2) Apprehend any individuals attempting to leave the search area to the south.
 - (3) Permit no one to enter the search area from the south until the operation has been terminated.
- c. Company "D" (-), 3d Recon Battalion
- (1) Establish ambush position vicinity of coordinates (BT 083712) on night of 14-15 August.
 - (2) By 150445H, occupy blocking positions from coordinates (BT 0837 south of Marble Mountain, and west to coordinates (BT 068704).
 - (3) Maintain OP's as required for surveillance of the search area.
 - (4) With representatives of 593d RF Company, establish a check point at coordinates (BT 072708) and halt all traffic entering or departing the search area. Vehicles will be detained and searched and will be permitted to proceed only if cleared by the 593d RF Company personnel. Pedestrians will not be permitted to enter or depart the search area until the operation has been terminated.
 - (5) Provide guides at fort at coordinates (BT 068704) at 150400H to guide 2d Platoon, Company "D" to LOD.
- d. 2d Platoon, Company "D", 1st Bn, 9th Mar
- (1) Contact Recon guides at coordinates (BT 068708) at 150400 for route to LOD.

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1st Bn, 9th Marines
DA KANG, RVN
050800H Aug 1965

ANNEX E (Lessons Learned) to After Action Report No. 1-65

Although good first-hand intelligence on the area was available and used, there can be no substitute for aerial reconnaissance and current aerial photos.

Close coordination and planning must be established between all units and agencies involved in an operation.

In terrain similar to that encountered, the company front must be reduced to a width which will permit the maintenance of a reserve platoon for mop-up, demolitions, and evacuation missions.

The rate of advance, where a methodical search and destroy mission is assigned, cannot be expected to exceed 75 to 100 meters per hour.

All radios must be calibrated and tested prior to any operation and all accessories for the PRC-10 must be on hand and carried with the radio.

When PRC-6's are used at the squad level, the PRC-10's used for platoon to company net must be on a different frequency than the PRC-6's.


Immediate return of fire and offensive action against snipers and firing positions will rout small groups of VC.

When troops are required to wear body armor and helmets, and when LVT's are available, rations, ammunition which is not immediately available, and any other equipment not absolutely necessary should be carried in the LVT's.


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(E)



- (2) Deploy on the LOD by 150445H in position indicated on Annex A (Operations Overlay).
 - (3) Upon deployment, establish contact with 3d Platoon, Company "B" at coordinates (BT 072702).
 - (4) On order, commence search and sweep northeast within assigned sector to the LOA.
 - (5) On order, terminate the operation and proceed to a designated assembly area for entrucking and return to Company CP area.
- e. 3d Platoon, Company "B", 1st Bn, 9th Mar
- (1) Deploy on the LOD by 150445H in position indicated on Annex A (Operations Overlay).
 - (2) Upon deployment, establish contact with 2d Platoon, Company "D" at coordinates BT 072702).
 - (3) On order, commence search and sweep northeast within assigned sector to the LOA.
 - (4) On order, terminate the operation and return to platoon position vicinity of coordinates (BT 070700).
- f. Coordinating Instructions
- (1) The least possible amount of property damage and invasion of privacy of indigeneous personnel is directed. Although this area is not considered secure, the villagers in general have indicated friendliness toward ARVN and US personnel. Irresponsible acts, destruction of private property, or mistreatment of civilians may have damaging effects on our ability to occupy and pacify this area in the near future. Anti-US propaganda has been disseminated in this area by the VC.
 - (2) All male civilians of military age (14-45), unless specifically identified as non-VC/VCS by the RF or Battalion S-2 representatives, will be apprehended and brought with the advancing troops to the collection point at the LOA. Women, children, and men over 45 years of age will not be apprehended unless unusual circumstances warrant it and then only on order of the applicable platoon commander.
 - (3) If, in the opinion of the platoon commander concerned, caves, tunnels, or other fortifications are more extensive than the normal family type of shelter, the location will be recorded and reported to the Battalion S-2 for further investigation and possible destruction.
 - (4) All other rules of engagement will apply.



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- (5) Overall coordination of the operation will be accomplished by S-3, 1st Bn, 9th Marines, including liaison with the 593d RF Company.
- (6) In view of the proximity of friendly troops and civilians, extreme caution is directed in the handling and use of firearms and other weapons.
- (7) Blocking units in position by 150445H.
- (8) Sweep/search units in contact and deployed by 150445H.
- (9) Cross the LOD and terminate the operation on order of 1/9.
- (10) Reports
 - (a) When in positions.
 - (b) Crossing LOD.
 - (c) SITREPS from searching units each one-half hour commencing 150500H.
 - (d) SPOTREPS as required.
 - (e) Arrival at LOA.
- (11) Battalion S-2 establish collection point vicinity of coordinates (BT 083707) by 150700H.
- (12) Direct liaison is authorized between participating units for movement to initial positions.
- (13) Contact is left to right, guide left.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

- a. In accordance with unit SOP's.
- b. Request emergency MedEvac through 1/9 Battalion Tac Net.
- c. Battalion 2 will assume responsibility for all VC/VCS when delivered to the Collection Point.
- d. Basic allowance of ammunition for each weapon, full canteens, normal combat equipment. Helmets and body armor at option of unit commanders.
- e. Units request necessary transportation from parent organizations.

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5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICSa. Command

- (1) The operation is a combined operation with the Commanding Officer, 1/9 exercising operational control of all USMC units and maintaining close coordination with the 593d RF Company and local village officials.
- (2) 1st Bn, 9th Marines Command/Liaison Group will be established in the fort located at coordinates (BT 068704) by 150445H.
- (3) Liaison Personnel
 - (a) One (1) USMC officer, two (2) USMC enlisted, and one (1) ARVN Liaison Officer attached to 593d RF Company blocking force. (Liaison Officer will arrange to meet with the 593d RF Company prior to deploying to blocking position.)
 - (b) One (1) ARVN Liaison Officer remain with 1/9 Command Group.
 - (c) Three (3) 593d RF Company personnel attached to Recon elements at check point in vicinity of coordinates (BT 072708). (Liaison personnel join Recon at 593d RF Company CP.)
 - (d) Three (3) 593d RF Company personnel with each sweep platoon. (platoons meet liaison personnel at bridge vicinity coordinates (BT 072703) at 0445H.)

b. Communications

- (1) Primary. Radio (PRC-10), Secondary - Messenger.
- (2) All participating units and Liaison Officer with 593d RF Company guard Battalion Tac Net commencing 150430H.
- (3) Communications Officer, 1/9 establish communications on Battalion Tac Net at fort by 150430H. Ensure positive communications with 1/9 Battalion CP.
- (4) ALC provide PRC-41 at CP for MedEvac requests.
- (5) Call Signs/Frequencies
 - (a) Units retain own call signs.

<u>CALL SIGN</u>	<u>FREQUENCY</u>	<u>IDENTITY</u>
Redwood 6	52.5	1/9 Command/Liaison Group (Net control)
Redwood	-do-	1/9 CP
Redwood Bravo 3	-do-	3d Plat, Co "B", 1/9

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<u>CALL SIGN</u>	<u>FREQUENCY</u>	<u>IDENTITY</u>
Redwood Delta 2	52.5	2d Plat, Co "D"
Scat Delta ()	-do-	Plat, Co "D"
Redwood 3 Alpha	-do-	593d RF Company Liaison Officer
Redwood 2	-do-	S-2 Officer, 1/9
Tarbush MedEvac	48.3	LZ Common (To contact Helo for MedEvac)

c. Pyrotechnic Signals

- (1) Green smoke or green star cluster - Marking friendly position.
- (2) Red smoke or red star cluster - Location of enemy.
- (3) Yellow smoke - Landing Zone marking.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL VERLE E. LUDWIG

H. A. HATCH
Major, U. S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

ANNEX:

A - Operations Overlay


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

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ANNEX A (Operations Order)
to 1st Bn, 9th Marines Frag-Order 8-65

1st Bn., 9th Mar
Danang, R.V.N.
130100H Aug., 1965
1965



INDOCHINA 1:50,000
Series I701
Sheets 6659 III &
6658 IV



By Command of LT.COL. V.E. LUDWIG

H.A. HATCH
MAJOR U.S. MARINE CORPS
EXECUTIVE OFFICER

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(07)